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The  investigation  of  the  sequencing  of  liberalization  in  the  EU  financial
services industry is the primary object of this study. The relevance of the EU
model for financial liberalization is threefold. First, the EU route towards
liberalization  in  financial  services  could  be  regarded  as  a  blueprint  for
opening  up  markets  worldwide,  especially  in  the  context  of  multilateral
liberalization within the WTO framework. Second, the EU model calls for an
investigation of the degree of compatibility between regional agreements and
multilateral  commitments.  Third,  the  EU  regional  experience  raises  the
question of the extent to which it can be transferred in different settings and
used  elsewhere  without  the  supranational  legislative,  judicial  and
administrative structure of the European Community. I argue that the intra-
EU  approach  –  minimum  harmonization,  mutual  recognition  and  home
country control – has a potential for widespread validity.
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in recent years.
In  the  past  three  decades,  world-wide  financial  systems  have  been
characterized by a consolidated trend of steady and continuous liberalization
of domestic markets. This has implied a shift from highly regulated financial
markets to more open systems, based on prudential regulation, reduced direct
intervention by the state in the credit allocation decisions, privatized financial
intermediaries,  increased  level  of  competition,  and  encouraged  entry  of
foreign providers of financial services.
The natural by-product of financial liberalization has been an explosion in the
international  provision  of  financial  services,  involving  the  cross-border
supply  of  financial  transactions  and  the  cross-border  establishment  of
offshoots. Given the wide-spread diffusion of international financial services,
the need for international agreements as to how the financial business should
be conducted has consequently arisen (White, 1996). One such international
agreement is represented by the General Agreement on Trade and Services
(GATS). 
GATS stands on the principle that opening markets is the way forward to
greater world prosperity. It came into force in 1995 and set international rules
aimed at removing barriers in services generally. It applies to all services
sectors, including financial services, encouraging the opening of markets for
trade and investments. The GATS rules cover investments as well as trade,
requiring  transparency  and  non-discrimination  between  suppliers.  These
general rules represent a starting point for reducing trade as well as non-trade
barriers, but need to be supplemented by specific commitments in service
sectors.  These  sectoral  commitments  determine  market  access,  i.e.  how
foreign firms get into a market, and national treatment, i.e. whether they are
treated the same as local firms within the market. 
During the GATS negotiations, the European Union played a relevant and
leading role in promoting the liberalization program. As a matter of fact, the
creation of a “regional market” – the so-called Single Market for Financial
Services – well in advance of the WTO negotiations seems to have helped
Western  European  countries  which  entered  the  negotiations  as  a  single
7compact group relatively prone to extend the benefits of the Single Market to
third countries. 
The objective of this study is to analyze the liberalization process that has
taken place in the EU financial services industry and evaluate it in the context
of negotiations on multilateral liberalization within the WTO framework. In
particular, three issues warrant a specific investigation.
First, as the path adopted by the EU represents the best case of successful
extensive  liberalization  in  the  financial  services  industry,  it  is  worth
understanding whether this route could represent a blueprint for opening up
markets worldwide. Hence, the sequence of liberalization and the problems
faced by the EU in liberalizing its markets are here studied in order to provide
insight in the areas that are likely to be most difficult to open internationally
and are expected to lift impediments to multilateral negotiations. 
Second, the EU model calls for an investigation of the degree of compatibility
between regional agreements and multilateral commitments, i.e. whether the
former  constitute  building  blocs  promoting  multilateral  liberalization  or
whether they tend to act as stumbling blocs, impeding further achievements
at multilateral level. 
Third, the EU model raises the question of the extent to which the intra-EU
approach – minimum harmonization, mutual recognition and home country
control – can be transferred in different settings and used elsewhere without
the  supranational  legislative,  judicial  and  administrative  structure  of  the
European Community. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I defines the financial services that
represent the object of study. Section II tackles the first issue and traces the
evolution of the market structure and legislative/regulatory framework of the
EU financial system culminating in the creation of the Single Market, the
main liberalization features of which are also analyzed. While discussing the
“European  model”  of  financial  integration,  this  section  focuses  on  those
hidden barriers that still constrain the creation of a truly Single Market for
financial services and therefore have led the European Commission to launch
its Financial Services Action Plan in 1999. Section III examines the potential
benefits to users deriving from the EU liberalization program, in terms of
reduced costs of services to savers and borrowers and of more efficient credit
institutions. The Second issue is dealt with in Section IV which analyzes the
level  of  compatibility  between  the  EU  experience  in  financial  services
8 Introductionliberalization and the GATS commitments. Subsequently, the Third issue is
investigated in Section V which addresses the question of whether the EU
liberalization approach could be transferred in different settings and used to
foster openness and a strengthening of domestic regulatory reforms by less
developed countries. The issue is investigated with specific reference to the
so-called  Mediterranean  Area  countries  and  the  Euromed  Agreements.
Section VI concludes. An Annex is also included; it overviews the issues
covered by the European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan which




1 COM(1999)232, 11.05.99, p.4.I. The definition of financial services
In the General Agreement on Trade in Services financial services are broadly
divided into two main categories (Article 5 of the Annex): i) insurance and
insurance-related services; ii) banking and other financial services. Each of
these two categories includes a more specific list of activities that illustrates,
rather than defines, the possible contents of the notion of financial services.
The breakdown is rather detailed and it is meant to help the WTO member
countries  in  scheduling  commitments  in  financial  services  while  being
well-adapted to face the on-going changes in the financial services industry
and markets. The list, in fact, is open to financial innovation; given the rapid
pace of change in the sector, any classification strictly based on the existent
would  become  quickly  obsolete.  This  also  explains  the  adoption  of
a classification based on the content of the service provided and not on the
institution  that  provides  the  service:  as  before,  the  rapid  change  in  the
financial  services  industry  and  the  process  of  globalization  of  financial
markets tend to reduce the attractiveness of such organizational models based
on the separation of the so-called pillars of the financial system (e.g. no
intermingling between the activities of banks, securities dealers and insurance
companies). In particular, the inclusion of “other financial services” in the list
of more traditional banking services – such as “acceptance of deposits and
other repayable funds from the public” and “lending of all types” – highlights
a wide  acknowledgement that  the  traditional  demarcations  between
investment and commercial banking are no longer justifiable on the grounds
of  financial  system  stability  purposes  and  that  specialized  banking  or
universal  banking  models  should  be  the  outcome  of  a decision  process
internal  to  the  financial  institution,  rather  than  the  result  of  specific
restrictions imposed by supervisory authorities. On the contrary, insurance
and banking are still considered as two distinct businesses notwithstanding
the greater appeal that the model of bancassurance is gaining. This could be
explained by the fact that this organizational model is still at its infancy in
developed  countries,  with  varying  degree  of  integration  between  the  two
businesses.  Besides,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  European  Community
approach towards financial integration has always treated banking, insurance
and  securities-related  activities  as  three  strictly  separate  segments  of  the
financial industry, each being addressed with specific pieces of legislation.
Such a watertight compartments approach reflected what, at national levels,
was the operational and normative rule. The Universal banking model was, in
11fact, mainly spread in German-speaking countries, while the rest of European
countries relied on different degrees of operational, territorial and maturity
specialization of their financial institutions. 
In  spite  of  these  differences,  the  basic  principles  underpinning  the
liberalization process in banking, insurance and the securities industry were
similar  –  minimum  harmonization,  mutual  recognition  and  home-country
control – and the liberalization path followed was also similar.
Given these premises, narrowing the scope of investigation on one particular
financial service should not represent a serious omission. Our choice falls
upon the banking services which present the best generalization opportunities
with respect to the main goal of drawing lessons from the EU experience for
developing countries. In fact, the banking services (acceptance of deposits
and  lending  of  all  types)  represent  the  core  of  the  financial  services,
irrespectively of the degree of a country development: the primary financial
needs of an economy, issuance of liquid “safe”
2 assets (deposits) and the
supply of loans of any type, are in fact satisfied by banks; therefore our
investigation of the sequence of liberalization in Europe will focus on the
banking industry. Securities services and insurance businesses might form
object of future investigation.
12 The definition of financial services
2 Deposits are perceived as safe assets, with a degree of safety similar to that attached to
T-bills, provided that an efficient and extensive system of safety-net is at work.II. The evolution of EU banking industry towards the
Single Market
Although  policymakers  tend  to  recommend  a case-by-case  approach  to
financial opening
3, it is commonly agreed that the sequencing of economic
liberalization should follow the path outlined in figure 1 (Edwards, 1990;
McKinnon 1993; Mohieldin, 1994; Mohieldin and Wabha, 1998; Hanson,
1994): the implementation of domestic real sector reforms should precede the
reform of the indigenous financial system; controls on capital movements
should  be  maintained  until  the  liberalization  of  the  external  trade  sector
(second step) and of the domestic financial sector (third step) has been fully
undertaken while, at the same time or prior to it, the stabilization program –
macroeconomic  stability  and  enforcement  of  prudential  regulation  –  is
implemented.  Capital  account  liberalization,  in  fact,  should  be  postponed
until the system is strong enough to avoid a misdirection of funds flowing into
sectors that are not productive and/or that unsound banks intermediate the
inflows to gamble for resurrection.
Of course, the exact sequencing and, above all, the speed of opening and
whether to adopt a big bang approach or a more gradual approach should
depend on the state of development of the economy and of its financial sector. 
Once the groundwork has been prepared, in particular with respect to the
strengthening of prudential regulation, financial liberalization (step three) can
be  considered  as  the  result  of  two  related  types  of  reforms:  domestic
deregulation and internationalization of the financial industry
4. 
Domestic deregulation implies allowing market forces to determine who gets
and grants credit, and at what price
5; allowing free entry to the financial
services industry to any agent who satisfies objective criteria laid down by
prudential supervision rules
6; giving banks the autonomy to set up internal
governance  procedures  that  should  be  used  to  determine  what  types  of
13
3 See Galbis (1994) and Johnston, Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996). 
4 See Williamson and Mahar (1998); Claessens and Glassner (1998).
5 Eliminating controls on credit and restrictions on interest rates would liberalize the allocative
function of banks.
6 Such as capital, managers and owners’ skills and reputation.business the bank can/is willing to engage in
7; how managers and staff are
appointed,  where  branches  should  be  opened  and/or  closed;  etc...;
reducing/eliminating governmental ownership in the financial system. 
The internationalization of the financial industry is fostered by eliminating
discrimination in treatment between foreign and domestic financial service
providers and by removing barriers to the cross-border provision of financial
services.
At  this  stage,  financial  liberalization  should  be  complemented  by  capital
account  liberalization  involving  the  removal  of  capital  controls  and
restrictions on the convertibility of the currency.
In this context, the EU model of economic liberalization cannot be considered
an  exception:  trade  liberalization  was  obtained  in  the  first  place,  while
financial reforms and capital account liberalization followed. The general
process  took  place  over  a long  time  span:  almost  three  decades  were
necessary to help EU banking and financial markets in evolving from being
comparatively protected towards more open settings. Of course, the path and
the speed of the deregulation process differed from country to country, given
the different political, economic and social systems which were influencing
and shaping the institutional and regulatory settings of individual members’
financial markets. At the beginning of the process, the twelve EC banking
systems varied significantly in their development, sophistication, operations
and openness
8. 
Although each member state carried out financial sector reforms choosing its
own pace to liberalization
9, the general impression is that the EU banking
systems shared the following specific sequence of financial liberalization:
14 The evolution of EU banking industry towards the Single Market
7 In other words, regulators would reduce or lift demarcation lines between different types of
financial service firms.
8 See Hendrie (1988), Howcroft and Whitehead (1990) and Dixon (1991) for overviews of the
EEC financial industries. 
9 Less advanced systems tended to implement financial sector reforms more gradually, making
use of the entire time window allowed by the directives and sometimes being late in complying
with the dictates of the directives.1: coordination  of  bank  legislation  (the  strengthening  of  prudential
measures) while introducing pieces of domestic deregulation
10.
The recognition that a level playing field can be more easily attained if there
is a consensus on minimal harmonization of rules represents the focal point
of the overall architecture of the Single Market Program (SMP). 
Discarding the initial idea that financial integration had to be attained through
the  harmonizing  of  all national  regulations  restraining  trade  in  financial
services and the compliance to common laws and policies
11, member states
selected a more pragmatic approach embedded in the White Paper (1985)
which set out a comprehensive program for the achievement of the single
market by 1992. In this respect, the White Paper could be regarded as a full
framework for dealing the sequence of liberalization in banking services. 
The new approach towards financial liberalization rested on the well-known
pillars of:
a) minimum harmonization. The Commission adopted the principle of the
“lowest common denominator”, i.e. the minimum level of coordination
and  harmonization  among  national  standards,  necessary  for  a truly
integrated internal market
12;
b) mutual recognition. The principle states that, once minimum agreement
has been reached on essential rules, each member state would have to
recognize the validity of the rules applied in other countries. Thus, if
a product or service satisfies the basic standards in one country, it may be
sold throughout the Community;
c) home  country  control.  The  principle  charges  each  member  state’s
supervisory  authority  with  the  responsibility  of  supervising  national
financial institutions, even when doing business in the territories of other
member states. 
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10 It must be noted that for countries with less sophisticated financial markets coordination of
bank supervision meant a precondition for domestic financial sector deregulation.
11 Given  the  very  different  instances  at  stake,  this  goal  was  too  ambitious  and  proved
unsuccessful. The EU legislative record on financial services in the 60’s and 70’s yielded a very
modest harvest: progress towards an integrated financial area was very limited, given the long
deferred implementation dates and the possibility of leveraging on safeguards clauses included in
the directives, which were extensively used by those member countries willing to defer the impact
of liberalization on their banking systems as long as possible.
12 The change of attitude is also revealed by the reform, in 1986, of the decision-making
process of the Community, which abolishes the requirement of unanimity for any Council decision
and introduces the concept of a qualified majority for most decisions involving the establishment
and the functioning of the internal market. Few exceptions are related to decisions involving fiscal
measures, matters concerning the free movements of people and the rights of workers. Of course,
the pursuit of such a principle implies the acceptance of compromises and a certain residual of
disparities among member countries.The main advantage in adopting mutual recognition rests on its ability to
instigate an endogenous process of convergence in national regulations. The
process is no longer imposed top-down by compulsory compliance to the
dictate of EC Directives, rather it is induced by bottom-up competitive forces
stemming from the interaction of operators, regulatory and organizational
systems. 
Of course, minimum levels of prudential rules are necessary to ensure that
convergence does not occur below a given floor. The 1986 Single European
Act (SEA) committed the EC countries to completing a single market in
goods and services by the end of 1992. As part of the process, a series of
Directives  concerning  the  financial  sector  were  issued  by  the  European
Commission and the Council of Ministers and subsequently implemented by
member states. Table 1 gives details of the sequence of relevant Directives
relating to the issue of banking integration in the EC.
In particular, the coordination has initially dealt with such relevant topics as
the definition of what a bank is and does, and the outlining of the objective
requirements to be asked by national authorities for granting new licenses.
This had the important effect of fostering banks’autonomy on their ability to
lend,  branch,  appoint  managers,  hold  participations  in  financial  and
non-financial  firms,  especially  in  those  countries  with  more  restricted
banking  systems.  This  acknowledgment  of  a bank’s autonomy  to  run  its
affairs was fundamental in order to: a) reduce and eventually eliminate any
state  intervention  both  in  the  process  of  credit  allocation  and  in  banks’
ownership,  encouraging  privatization  of  the  banking  sector;  b)  evolve
banking regulation and supervision from the use of quantitative restrictions
(structural regulation) to the application of prudential measures
13. 
It was accepted that an authentic level playing field could be attained through:
a) the prescription of uniform accounting and reporting standards at EU-wide
level; b) the definition of relevant measures enabling supervisory authorities
pursuing the goal of a sound and safe financial system (risk adjusted capital
ratios; limits to large exposures, depositors’ guarantee).
16 The evolution of EU banking industry towards the Single Market
13 This, in particular, leads to the abandonment of interest rates ceilings and quotas on credit
expansion, in the first place; then barriers to market entrance are gradually lifted. For example,
licensing of new domestic banks and foreign banks will be carried out on the basis of explicit and
objective rules and no longer under the economic needs test. 2: adoption of a simultaneous approach for opening up the financial sector
to foreign competition and the freeing of capital account transactions. 
Any complete process of financial sector liberalization has to tackle the issue
of explicit and implicit barriers, the former comprising limits to cross-border
movements  of  financial  services  and  restrictions  to  foreign  direct
investments, the latter comprising differences in regulatory, legal and tax
systems. 
It is important to understand that regulatory-driven differences in institutional
organization do represent implicit barriers to financial integration and market
access. In fact, as long as the host country’s regulations, determining the
range  of  markets  and  activities  in  which  the  various  types  of  financial
intermediaries could operate dramatically varies, foreign banks penetration is
hampered, without the setting of explicit barriers: firms structured to operate
in one institutional climate could find it too costly to fulfill the requirements
they would face in a foreign country, and avoid entering the new market. For
instance, a bank resident in universal banking systems would face a deep
limitation in the range of its activities and an alteration of its “intermediation
formula” when it considers operating in more restricted systems – such as
those  where  no  intermingling  between  banking,  financial  and  insurance
activities is permitted –, where it would be denied the security license needed
to combine credit and portfolio services. 
Explicit trade barriers were present with respect to the following aspects of
regulation:  a)  controls  on  international  capital  movements  and  foreign
exchange transactions; b) restrictions on entry by foreign institutions. The
former tends to limit the free cross-border provision of financial services, i.e.
the provision of financial services by a financial firm located in a country to
a customer  residing  in  another  country,  without  the  establishment  of
a commercial presence in the country of the customer
14. The latter involves
restrictions  or  discriminatory  administrative  practices  on  direct  foreign
investments in financial services. 
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14 Cross-border trade is, in fact, often associated with an international capital transaction.
Several examples can be given: accepting deposit from a non-resident customer or making loans
to a non-resident require international capital transactions as well as the trading of securities for
the account of non-resident customers; contingent claims financial services, such as insurance
policies, may involve capital transactions, when the occurrence of the insured event involves
a payout. Services such as investment advisory services, when provided cross-border, are not
associated  with  capital  transaction  Controls  on  cross-border  movements  of  financial  services
discriminates domestic versus foreign services, by establishing a different regulatory treatment.
The removal of such controls is, therefore, a prerequisite for an integrated financial market. Complete liberalization on controls on capital account movements is now
a rule among EU countries
15. However, this is the result of a fairly recent
process. In fact, although the Treaty of Rome (1957) envisioned the free
movement of capital – along with that of persons and services – as one of the
essential conditions towards the establishment of a common market, in the
early ’70s only Germany had fairly liberal capital-account policies. 
The process of capital movement liberalization showed a slow progress due
to the trade-off that national authorities were facing when trying to obtain the
contrasting goals of free commercial and financial trade and of retaining
a persistent and autonomous control over domestic economic and monetary
policies. In particular, a complete liberalization of capital-account movements
was seen as a major threat to the domestic exchange-rate policy, especially by
those  countries  with  considerable  balance-of-payment  imbalances  such  as
France and Italy. 
The trade-off between macroeconomic goals and free circulation of goods
and capital was particularly stringent in the economic environment of the
’70s: the uncertainties in world financial markets following the crisis of the
dollar, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed parities and the two
oil shocks led a number of countries to postpone the ease of capital controls
or  even  to  reintroduce  them  to  help  “weather”  the  growing  financial
instabilities. Free trade in goods thus came to coexist in Europe with a system
of restricted financial flows
16. Capital movements started to be liberalized in
the  second  half  of  the  ’80s,  when  both  the  world  macro  conditions  had
improved and the EC had accelerated the process of creation of the Single
Market, with a renovated confidence in its ability to pursue this important
goal. Therefore, at the end of 1983, only the UK and Germany had completely
liberalized their capital movements. Partial freedom of capital movements
existed in the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium. All other countries had
opted for the safeguard clause and delayed, although to different extents, the
ease of their extensive exchange controls
17. 
Negotiations on ending capital controls saw two different types of players. On
the one end, stood the Germans and the British, with their vision of a market
18 The evolution of EU banking industry towards the Single Market
15 Indeed, it is virtually complete in all OECD countries. See Edey and Hviding (1995).
16 See Dini (1986).
17 See OECD (1984) and OECD (1987) for excellent surveys on exchange controls and other
measures affecting both cross-border international banking operations and the international trade
in securities in the EC countries.open to the world; on the other end, stood the French aspiration to create
a more exclusive internal financial space, subject to EC law and policy and
clearly distinct from world markets
18. Liberalization of capital flows entailed
a compromise  between  these  two  divergent  positions:  free  traders  versus
proponents of a single, European internal market, distinct from global-market
integration.  The  former  were  focusing  on  the  mere  elimination  of  the
remaining  obstacles  to  free  capital  flows;  the  latter  were  looking  for  an
agreement on minimum common rules ruling an EU-wide integrated financial
space.  Other  members’ position,  such  as  of  those  countries  with  large
public-sector deficits – Italy, Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal –, was mainly
concentrated on struggling for the maintenance of safeguard clauses, in order
to avoid the political consequences of having to lift capital controls and to
face “the political consequences of a cutting back on budgetary outlays”
19. 
The above mentioned divergences also arose with respect to the decision of
whether to extend the freedom of capital flows to non-EU countries. Free
traders supported the idea that the liberalization should be extended erga
omnes, leveraging on to the benefits that a globalized market could bring
about. Eventually, German and British support for the idea of a European
integrated financial area was only won by full acceptance of the principle of
capital  liberalization  erga  omnes
20.  Therefore,  the  June  1988  directive
confirmed the two principles of complete unconditional, free movement of
capital and of non-discrimination based on nationality
21. 
Regulatory  barriers  are  not  confined  to  the  impediments  of  free  capital
movement across borders. In trade in services, either the consumer has to be
taken  physically  to  the  product  (as  in  tourism)  or  the  service  has  to  be
provided to consumers through some directly-connecting mechanisms. Given
the  modern  telecommunication  techniques  and  the  success  of  internet
banking, one could now easily imagine all banking services being supplied
directly to customers in other countries, without the need of an established
presence  of  the  supplier  in  the  importing  country.  In  principle,  the
internationalization of banking is assured and foreign market access becomes
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18 See Story and Walter (1997), p. 256.
19 Story and Walter (1997), p. 255
20 Lelakis (1988)
21 Nevertheless, the latter remained subject to some national susceptibilities: each country
could, in fact, impose unilateral restrictions when legitimate national interests – such as problems
of monetary regulation – were at stake. All in all, it represented a political commitment by EC
countries to offer national treatment to third countries as far as inflows and outflows of capitals
concern. no longer an issue. In practice, in the financial services industry, especially in
its retail segment, other factors
22 play an important role and might require
a physical presence in the local market. Therefore, long distance transactions
in the provision of financial services are not very widespread, and mainly
concentrated in the securities trading business. The supply of a large bunch of
traditional  banking  services  still  requires  some  form  of  foreign  direct
investment (FDI), ranging from a low-level presence (representative offices)
to successively higher levels of involvement in the form of subsidiaries, joint
ventures and full branches in host country. Consequently, in the 1970s barriers
to entry represented the main impediment to a free financial area. 
In general, barriers to entry reduce the contestability of a market, i.e. the
extent to which the market is open to competition by potential newcomers. As
a result, both the system as a whole and each banking institution are not
compelled  to  attain  higher  standards  of  efficiency  at  the  expense  of
consumers, who usually end up with a smaller range of traditional financial
products and services, highly priced and of lower quality with respect to
a situation where greater competition is in place. 
Limits  to  market  entry  were  the  rule  during  the  ’70s in  all  EU  banking
systems
23, given the pre-eminence ascribed to structural regulation on the
grounds that supervisory authorities were entrusted with the primary goal of
guaranteeing the stability of financial markets, even at the expenses of the
other  two  somewhat  contrasting  goals  of  improving  the  efficiency  of  the
system  and  of  promoting  a sound  competition  among  institutions.  The
implied restrictions on entry could apply to both domestic and foreign banks;
however, foreign banks were generally at a disadvantage with respect to their
host country counterparts, when trying to compete in their local markets.
A major reason for justifying the imposition of entry restraints was the desire
to preclude or limit foreign ownership in a sector that is regarded as vital to
the proper functioning of the national economy and the attainment of national
policy goals
24. 
20 The evolution of EU banking industry towards the Single Market
22 Albeit the process of globalization in financial services, local customs, local tastes as well
as the ability of the seller to provide adequate “after-sale” assistance are still vital factors in retail
banking. Besides, knowledge of the local market facilitates the credit evaluation of potential
customers: as such it is an extremely valuable asset which might constitute an economic barrier to
entry.
23 See Pecchioli (1983) and OECD (1983) for an exhaustive survey on the legal restrictions
applied by member countries on foreign banks entry.
24 See Pecchioli (1983).The delicate question of liberalizing market access was tackled for the first
time with the First Banking Coordination Directive (77/780/EEC) issued in
1977 and introducing the principle of national treatment to be applied to
foreign banks’ branches. However, such a principle is applicable to a notion
of “foreign bank’s branch” that comprises only EC banks. Hence, the entry
and the establishment rules for foreign EC banks are the same as for domestic
institutions in each member state. Art. 9 regulates the treatment of branches
of non-member states banks and requires member states not to apply less
stringent rules to branches of credit institutions from third countries than to
branches of credit institutions from member states. 
National treatment, however, states nothing more than foreign and domestic
firms should compete on a level playing field, provided that they play in
accordance to the host country national requirements. This means that foreign
banks need to obtain the authorization from the competent supervisory body
of each host country where they wish to establish a branch and to conform to
the host country’s requirements on such things as minimum capital, solvency
ratios,  legal  form,  organizational  and  operational  structure.  Given  the
institutional  differences  among  member  states,  national  treatment  meant
substituting restrictions on entry with explicit restrictions on the range of
activities  allowed.  The  Second  Banking  Coordination  Directive
(89/646/EEC)  introduced  the  application  of  the  principle  of  mutual
recognition, better known under the name of “single passport”. This provides
member  states  banks  both  the  freedom  of  supply  and  the  freedom  of
establishment within the EU
25. 
The  above  mentioned  different  regulations  have  resulted  in  EU  domestic
banking markets that were far from being homogeneous in terms of market
openness. Table 2 provides some rough evidence of this heterogeneity: even
in more recent times, the degree of openness to foreign penetration of EC
markets varies considerably within the EU. The share of foreign banks’assets
to total banking assets in 1997 varied from a minimum of 2.8% in Germany
26
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25 Besides, the single passport helped completing the process of domestic deregulation towards
the elimination of those restrictions limiting the bank’s choice over the range of activities to be
performed. As such, a convergence process in institutional organization descended and a potential
for greater competition within the Single Market was led down (see par. III)
26 The degree of financial liberalization and the absence of other restrictive measures are
necessary yet not sufficient conditions to explain the foreign bank presence in a country. Germany
is emblematic in this sense. Albeit its banking system was relatively free from discriminatory
regulations and attracted a relatively large number of foreign banks, their impact on the indigenous
market was limited, given their very low market share. In fact, the German market was characterized
by close bank-firm relationships, which in practice insulated it from external competition.to a maximum of 99% in Luxembourg. The main reasons for such a variation
are to be attributed, on the one side, to the still existing legal, fiscal and
institutional  obstacles  and,  on  the  other  side,  to  the  ongoing  process  of
cross-EU  merging  and  acquisition  activity,  joint  ventures  and  strategic
alliances that allows an easier, quicker and most cost-effective entry into
foreign markets. The UK and Luxembourg are confirmed as international
financial  centers  by  overall  market  shares  of  foreign  branches  and
subsidiaries of more than 50%; the presence of foreign banks in Ireland is
increasing, which demonstrates that, external barriers being the same, fiscal
exemptions are crucial in attracting foreign capital.
In sum, the simultaneous approach indicated as point 2 was rendered possible
by the fact that the process towards the completion of the Single Market
started with a set of measures aimed at strengthening minimum common rules
for  prudential  regulation  (see  table  1),  such  as  the  harmonization  of
accounting  and  reporting  rules  or  the  requirements  for  consolidated
supervision.  The  strengthening  and  the  harmonization  of  prudential
regulation measures determined the success of the Single Market project,
allowing  mutual  recognition  of  national  standards  replacing  full
harmonization of rules as a realizable goal. However, it should be noted that
countries with less developed financial markets were allowed to postpone
complete capital flows liberalization on the grounds that measures to limit
short-term foreign currency denominated inflows and outflows are deemed
necessary  as  long  as  relevant  domestic  reforms,  pertaining  to  the
strengthening of the markets and regulation, are not fully undertaken. For
such  countries,  complete  financial  sector  reform  preceded  the  freeing  of
capital account transactions (as suggested in the classic formula for financial
liberalization).
Notwithstanding the profound strides made in the last three decades towards
providing a single European market for financial services, the EU financial
markets in 1999 “remain segmented and business and consumers continue to
be deprived of direct access to cross-border financial institutions”
27. 
There are many reasons why the creation of a legal framework to permit
a single internal market will not immediately bring one into existence. In
retail  markets  for  financial  services,  local  tastes,  local  customs  and  the
physical ability to market products and to provide an adequate “after sale”
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27 European Commission (1999).service are vital factors in selling products across frontiers. According to
White (1996), retail-banking services in Europe are still “overwhelmingly
provided by national corporate entities”. On the contrary, a greater level of
internationalization was easier to achieve in wholesale markets, where the
above  mentioned  elements  are  less  important:  BIS  data  on  international
financial activity and bank’s external positions confirm a steady growth of
cross-border wholesale commercial banking
28. This situation may change in
the  near  future  when  a greater  use  of  internet  and  the  spread  of  remote
delivery systems
29 will help fostering cross-border retail banking. 
Recognizing the existence of substantive differences between the set of EU
legislation and the national arrangements relating to financial transactions, at
the end of 1998 the EU Commission identified a range of issues calling for
urgent action in order to reap the commercial opportunities offered by a single
financial market. Subsequently, in May 1999 the Commission presented its
“Financial Services Action Plan”
30, meant to highlight the priorities for a true
single  financial  market;  guide  the  financial  services  policy  over  the  next
coming years; plan the needed legislation, in terms of priority of action (what
comes first) and time-scale achievements (when results should be tentatively
obtained); identify a number of mechanisms which may contribute to the
realization  of  these  priorities
31.  Similarly  to  the  1985  white  paper,  the
“financial services action plan” sets up a framework for future action and
represents “an aspirational programme for rapid progress towards a single
financial market”. 
What is immediately apparent is the fact that the new plan considers the
financial industry as a whole, no longer segmented in the three main sectors
of banking, insurance and securities business. Therefore priorities are not
set-up  with  regard  to  this  common  tri-partition  of  the  financial  industry;
instead,  a new  approach  is  undertaken,  which  considers  separately  the
specific issues pertaining to the wholesale market, to the retail markets and
sound supervisory structures. 
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28 See OECD (2000), for a complete survey on these trends in wholesale commercial banking,
investment banking and wholesale investment services.
29 Telephone banking and PC banking are examples of non-traditional delivery channels,
becoming increasingly popular as the population become more IT literate, more attentive on
cost-saving and, finally, more confident on the matter of security in personal data transfer.
30 COM (1999) 232. 11.5.99 Financial services: implementing the framework for financial
markets: action plan. European Commission.
31 See European Commission (1999). Along  with  these  specific  measures,  two  “more  general”  conditions  are
deemed to apply for the sake of a smoothly functioning, efficient EU financial
market: corporate governance and tax-coordination. Efforts are to be taken in
order to harmonize national codes of corporate governance – arrangements
for the exercise of voting rights by shareholders in other member countries,
to provide one example – and co-ordinate the tax treatment of savings. Truly
the harmonization of taxation is proving one of the most difficult areas for
member states to resolve. 
The sequence of further liberalization in the financial industry is periodically
monitored  in  order  to  assess  the  progress,  direction  and  results  of  the
integration of the EU financial services sector
32.
In sum, room for improvement rests upon the achievement of truly enhanced
transparency of laws and regulations and of effective cross-border trade in
response  to  the  information  technology  revolution.  Eventually,  only
differences  in  language,  culture  and  customs  should  remain  as  potential
barriers to a free movement of banking services throughout the EU region.
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32 See “Progress on the Financial Services Action Plan”, (2002 November), Commission of the
European Communities. III. The assessment of the impact of the Single Market 
Benefits of financial reforms and liberalization to users of financial services
take two essential forms: an increase in quality and array of services provided
by (more efficient) institutions and reduced costs of services, for both savers
and borrowers. The financial integration undertaken by the European Union
thus represents a valuable experiment to assess the presence and the extent of
such benefits. 
Before the 1992 initiative, the Commission had envisaged (Cecchini Report,
1988) that the Single Market would have brought about widespread reduction
in  unit  costs  of  financial  services  thanks  to  greater  competition  in
oligopolistic  markets,  which  in  fact  would  have  been  the  driver  for  the
reduction of excess profits, a better control of costs by bank managers and an
effective exploitation of economies of scale and scope. Besides, a substantial
increase  in  cross-border  trade  and  cross-border  merger  and  acquisition
activity was envisaged as a direct response by banks seeking for economies
of scale and scope. 
More recently, an ex post evaluation of the Single Market Program’s impact
was  commissioned  to  several  independent  consultants  by  the  European
Commission (1997)
33. The study’s key findings can be summarized as follows:
✦ no dramatic price reduction in financial services was found
34; besides, the
potential for price convergence on lower average EU prices as highlighted
by the Cecchini Report was not fully gained. Nonetheless, those countries
with  relatively  more  regulated  banking  system  prior  to  the  program
(Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal) experienced the largest level of price
reduction (in particular in the wholesale lending business) and this was
mainly  attributed  (by  the  interviewed  bankers)  to  the  Single  Market
Program (SMP) implementation. Conversely, banks in the UK attributed
25
33 See Gardener, Edward P.M., Molyneux, Philip & Moore, Barry (eds.), (2002), for the most
updated evaluation of the effects of the SMP. The degree of banking sector integration in Europe
and its evolution over time is also investigated in a recent occasional paper from the ECB (Cabral
et al., December 2002).
34 Price refers to the difference between the rate charged on corporate and retail loans (or
deposits)  and  the  three  months  interbank  rate.  Evidence  is  derived  from  postal  and  Eurostat
surveys alongside with OECD data on international and domestic markets’ interest rates.very little of margin reduction to the SMP and this, in turn, is consistent
with their relatively more open banking markets;
✦ the most common strategic response by banks to increased competition
from  the  SMP was  the  widening  of  the  array  of  services  offered
(diversification  and  innovation),  an  increase  in  their  quality,  the
introduction of new delivery and selling channels as well as a shifting of
their activities into areas such as fee and commission based investment
advice. The trend towards the universalization of the model of bank was
also an important driver for the increase of the range of products and
services delivered;
✦ there was a large potential for scale and scope economies, as the SMP has
extended the relevant market size particularly at the wholesale end of the
market. EU banks were generally targeting – yet with different degrees of
emphasis  and  willingness  –  to  reduce  their  cost/income  ratios,  reduce
X-inefficiencies and deploy technology to achieve this;
✦ the  SMP stimulated  a degree  of  internationalization  of  EU  banks,
a phenomenon which took a number of forms ranging from increased trade
in financial services to cross-border investment activity including mergers
and acquisitions, strategic alliances and joint ventures and the opening of
cross-border branches. 
Two main reasons can explain the mixed results on the impact of the SMP on
the banking sector, i.e. higher rate of product and services diversification and
improved quality, increased banks’ efficiency but little impact on financial
services prices. First, the time horizon of the study – three years after the SMP
implementation – might have been too short; more time may need to elapse
before the benefits of the liberalization could be fully appreciated. Second,
that other barriers were, and might be still in force which present obstacles to
banks in fully exploiting the opportunities afforded by the single market. As
a matter of fact, a range of non-trade barriers remains in the banking sector as
the previous paragraph highlighted. 
More  recent  data  on  the  cost  of  banking  services  in  Europe,  on  banks’
performance  and  cross-border  M&A activity  can  be  only  partially
informative,  with  respect  to  our  goal  of  documenting  the  benefits  to
consumers  from  financial  services  liberalization,  since  another  major
ingredient, the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the
introduction  of  the  euro,  has  come  into  play.  Distinguishing  between  the
26 The assessment of the impact of the Single Marketimpact  of  reduced  inflation  –  induced  by  the  EMU  –  and  the  effect  of
increased  competition  –  caused  by  the  SMP –  on  the  prices  of  banking
services in not an easy task. Is the convergence in interest rates, towards the
lowest price, that characterized the most recent years explained by the first
aspect or by the second influence? 
A simple and rough measure of the degree of interest rate convergence is an
index of dispersion, measured by the non-weighted standard deviation of
(real) interest rates, or “σ -convergence” (Adam et al. 2001; Fernandez de
Guevara et al., 2002). 
Figures  2  and  3  show  the  empirical  evidence  of  σ -convergence  in  retail
interest rates for selected EU countries
35, during the period 1980–2000
36. This
measure declines steadily over time after 1992 for deposit rates, although in
year 2000 deposit rates can vary from a minimum of 0.4% in Ireland to
a maximum  of  4.39%  in  France.  The  increase  in  deposit  interest  rates
reflected increases in money market interest rates associated with increases in
ECB interest rates in year 2000. The different reactions of national bank
interest  rates  can  be  explained  by  differences  in  the  sluggishness  in  the
pass-through  of  market  rates  to  bank  interest  rates  reflecting  segmented
markets at the national level, where banks enjoy different degree of market
power. 
As  far  as  the  lending  rates  are  concerned  (figure  3),  the  process  of
convergence is less clear, at least in the years subsequent to the SMP, while
this trend becomes more evident starting from 1998, when the EMU factor
come directly into play and can be considered the main driver
37. The increase
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35 Figure 2 illustrates deposit rates paid on time deposits while figure 3 shows lending rates on
short term loan to enterprises. A caveat must be introduced when using these figures, since,
although they can be considered to be, at the moment, the main indicators of retail financial market
conditions in the member state concerned, international comparisons could be hampered by the
fact that these rates are not EU harmonized and differences may be attributable to differentiation
in  product  characteristics  and/or  in  the  risk  of  borrowers.  Countries  under  investigation  are:
Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal  and  Spain,  for  which
a complete time-series of relevant deposit and lending rates were available. 
36 Alternatively,  one  could  compare  the  standard  deviation  of  the  average  monthly  retail
interest rates calculated over two different one-year periods, say before and after the SMP or
before and after the introduction of the Euro. A decrease in the level of this measure suggests
across countries convergence in banking interest rates. See Cabral et al., (2002).
37 See also Cabral et al. (2002, p.35):”Between 1998–99 and 2001–2002 differences across
countries in household and corporate lending rates and deposit rates declined sharply in the euro
area. However, this development seems to be mainly due to convergence in the macro-level
monetary conditions brought about by the introduction of the euro”.in  the  index  of  dispersion  right  after  the  implementation  of  the  SMP in
1993–1994 may reflect different degrees of borrowers’ risk in a period of
generalized recession and specific fragility in the national economy after the
EMS crisis in the autumn of 1992.
A more sophisticated investigation of interest convergence could be based on
moving principal component analysis
38. This has been applied to interest rate
changes, over a moving period of 70 months from 1984 onward; figures 4 and
5 show the explanatory power of the first four principal components
39 of
changes in respectively deposit and lending interest rates over time in selected
EU countries
40. As Fase and Vlaar (1998) explained with respect to capital
markets interest rates, the first principal component captures the maximum
percentage of the total variation in the series that can be explained by just one
common factor. If such first component strengthens its explanatory power
over time, it means that the correlations between national rates have increased
during the period under study, thus indicating increased convergence. With
respect to our sample, it should be noticed that such convergence does not
make  its  appearance  immediately  after  the  SMP implementation,  but
sometime later, at the end of the ’90s, when the realization of the monetary
union comes into direct play. This is particularly evident for lending rates, for
which the first component steadily reduces its importance starting from 1992
when domestic factors, such as the different degree of recession and/or the
diverse impact of the EMS crisis experienced by each member state, become
more relevant in explaining domestic banking rates. Beginning with 1999,
things start to change and a main common factor, this time being the EMU,
captures the trend towards greater convergence. 
Along  with  the  level  of  convergence  in  interest  rates,  it  is  interesting  to
analyze  the  trend  in  the  level  of  the  mark-up  and  mark-down,  defined
respectively as the difference between the 3-month money market rate and the
lending/deposit rate (see table 3) and expressing the margin earned by banks
in their intermediation activity (or the cost of financial intermediation) with
respect to a risk-free activity. The dimension of these measures depends,
among other things, on the monetary policy, market power of banks, risk of
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38 See Fase M.M.G.(1999) for applications of this powerful statistical tool to market interest
rates. 
39 These represent more than 80% of total variation; up to three principal components, a good
70% of total variation is explained. 
40 The exercise was carried over a moving sample of 70 months, considering interest rates
changes in order to guarantee that the original series are statistically stationary. All series were
weighted equally, having based the estimations on the correlation matrix. borrowers. In order to take into consideration the effect of decreasing market
interest rates, that characterized the period 1993–1999 relevant to our study,
it is useful to compare the percent change of money market rates and the
analogous change in the mark-up and mark-down. Apart from Belgium, EU
banks  have  experienced  a cost  of  funding  (through  deposits)  that  has
over-incorporated  the  reductions  in  market  rates,  which  might  reflect  the
competitive  conditions  in  the  domestic  banking  markets  (in  particular,  in
France,  Germany  Portugal  and  Spain).  With  respect  to  the  lending  side,
figures  confirm  a non  homogeneous  picture  within  the  EU.  Decreasing
mark-ups  can  be  observed  in  Italy,  Portugal  and  Spain  over  the  period
1993–97, confirming the trend found by the European Commission report
(1997) of price reduction in the retail loan markets of these countries
41. These
reductions can be partially attributable to an increase in bank competition as
the pronounced fall in the mark-ups provides evidence of a drop in lending
rates higher than the reduction in money market rates. More interestingly,
mark-ups in Belgium, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands have increased
over the same period, where one can observe lending rates’ sluggishness in
responding to money market rates’ decline. Again, this is not sufficient to
stipulate that these countries have benefited less from increased competition.
Higher lending rates can, among other things, be consistent with better banks’
expertise in pricing borrowers.
As the EU report predicted, the large potential for economies of scale and
scope  has  been  the  driver  for  concentration  activity  in  the  EU  area. The
number  of  M&A,  joint  ventures  and  strategic  alliances  has  increased,
although this process is mainly confined to national boundaries and led to the
creation of large national institutions, ready to compete in the Single Market
(see ECB, 2000). Indeed, the EMU, more than the SMP, is considered the
main driver for the reduction of existing excess capacity, for profitability
enhancement  and  increased  internationalization  and  geographical
diversification of EU banks (see The ECB, 1999 and Cabral et al., 2002, for
extensive data on concentration, capacity and profitability ratios of the EU
banking systems).
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41 For more recent years, covering the period 1998–2002, Cabral et al. (2002) find similar
results both in household and corporate lending sectors. IV. The EU Single Market and the GATS agreements:
degree of compatibility 
We  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  relationships  existing  between  the  EU
regional program and the first multilateral agreement on financial services,
i.e. the GATS.
It  has  been  argued  that  the  degree  of  compatibility  between  regional
liberalization  of  services  (including  financial  services)  and  multilateral
liberalization depends on “whether regional agreements effectively lead to
significant liberalization and if such arrangements go substantially beyond
what is already feasible in the multilateral context” (Mohieldin and Wahba,
1998). In general, it is broadly recognized that regional agreements exert
many positive influences on multilateral integration and openness, since they
act  as  useful  laboratories  for  experimenting  what  could  be  achieved  at
a higher, and more complex, level
42. Hence, regional integrated areas are
considered  “as  important  mechanisms  for  ensuring  forms  of  international
governance,  contributing  to  a more  liberal  multilateral  trading  system”
(Falautano and Guerrieri, 2000). 
So far, the analysis seems to highlight the existence of a one-way relationship
among the two different levels of commitments in services liberalization –
regional and multilateral –, with the lower level greatly influencing the higher
level of negotiations, yet not being influenced by the latter. In other words,
multilateral  agreements  appear  to  benefit  from  regional  agreements,  yet
without enlarging the scope of liberalization already achieved at the lower,
regional  level,  for  they  tend  to  merely  endorse  the  status  quo.  A more
optimistic  point  of  view  would  stress  the  fact  that,  at  least,  multilateral
commitments impose certain constraints on the domestic/regional level – no
possibility  to  roll-back  from  what  achieved;  the  principle  of  progressive
liberalization  is  embedded  in  GATS/WTO  negotiations  so  that  regional
31
42 See  Summers,  1991;  Whalley,  1996;  Francois,  1997  (unilateral  trade  reforms  are
implemented in order to favor multilateral liberalization); Lawrence, 1996 (regional agreements
are levers for addressing more complex issues at the multilateral level); Krugman, 1993 (reduction
of number of players at multilateral levels makes collective actions easier).agreements most likely act as building blocs for further achievement in trade
and services liberalization. 
An opposite stream of literature (Krugman, 1991; Bhagwati and Panagariya,
1996;  Bond  and  Syropoulos,  1996;  Levy,  1996)  suggests  that  regional
agreements  do  not  foster  multilateralism  for  they  intrinsically  tend  to  be
substitutes for multilateral liberalization, for instance developing their own
capital markets, separate from the global market (as Europe tried and partially
was able to do so), or pursuing regional development strategies, discriminating
against  outsiders. As  such,  regional  integration  agreements  would  act  as
stumbling blocs more than building blocs (Falautano and Guerrieri, 2000).
The fact that those regional liberalization agreements, such as the EU and
NAFTA, heavily influenced the decision to launch the GATS negotiations and
represented the driving forces for the progress achieved in the multilateral
discussions seems to give credit to the “building blocs” hypothesis (Hoekman
and Sauvé, 1994). In fact, during the GATS negotiations, the European Union
played a significant and leading role in promoting the liberalization program.
The  creation  of  a “regional  market”  –  the  so-called  Single  Market  for
Financial Services – well in advance of the GATS negotiations helped EU
countries  appreciate  the  positive  effects  of  such  agreements,  for  both
consumers and producers. Therefore, they entered the GATS negotiations as
a single  compact  group  supported  by  strong  arguments  in  favor  of
liberalization and with no specific fears to extend to third parties the degree
of liberalization achieved among member states. 
Although  this  cannot  represent  conclusive  evidence  in  favor  of  the
desirability of regional agreements, it clearly points out that regionalism can
represent a positive lever for multilateral trade cooperation, depending on the
circumstances. This can explain why the EU Trade Ministers welcome and
push towards the creation of a regional integration among Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) countries as a first important step leading to a truly
beneficial EU-Mediterranean partnership
43.
32 The EU Single Market and the GATS agreements: degree of compatibility
43 See Communications from Trade Directorate-General of the EU Commission (Presidency
conclusions, Brussels, 29 May, 2001). In particular it is stressed that “the Commission is ready to
support any initiative as well as other project contributing to regional integration by providing the
necessary technical assistance”. A recent study published in the ECB occasional paper series
(Mazzaferro  et  al.,  December  2002)  reviews  the  economics  aspects  of  the  institutional
arrangements between the euro area and the four main regions surrounding it, among which the
Middle East and Northern Africa region. This study also analyzes the economic relations (trade,
financial and monetary links) between the Euro area and its neighbouring regions. As such, it becomes vital to investigate the degree of compatibility between
the  EU  experience  in  financial  services  liberalization  and  the  GATS
commitments, while highlighting, if any, what circumstances were capable of
ensuring that the EU Single Market could promote multilateral liberalization
in financial services and, on the other side, whether the interaction between
the two different levels of negotiation, regional and multilateral, led the latter
to extend the provisions embedded in the Single Market Program with respect
to the treatment of third countries. 
In general, as an effect of the regional liberalization, the EC financial services
sector  is  very  open  to  foreign  competition.  Establishment  of  banking,
insurance and securities subsidiaries is subject to no restrictions other than the
usual  prudential  measures.  Foreign  institutions  can  establish  subsidiaries
which benefit from a “single passport” under national treatment conditions,
while direct branching is regulated under national treatment conditions in
each member state
44. More specifically, looking at the precise commitments
made by the European Communities and their member states (see table 4)
45
in the banking and other financial services sectors, the following remarks
arise:
a) commitments are binding for all member states, except where specific
national reservations are made. Limitations are based on existing national
legislation and, in general, they typically apply equally to both European
and non-EU firms; as such national treatment is preserved
46. 
b) commitments  are  made  in  both  trade  and  investments,  as  per  the
Understanding. In fact, during the negotiation of the GATS, a group of
mainly  developed  countries  decided  that  they  would  make  their
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44It should be noted that third-countries’banking institutions can obtain the single license if and
only if they are established directly in the form of asubsidiary. On the contrary, branches established
directly in a member-state by non-Community banking institutions are not eligible for the single
passport, i.e. they only receive an authorization to operate in the territory of the member state under
national treatment and may be required to satisfy anumber of specific prudential requirements such
as separate capitalization. See GATS 2000: financial services. Proposal from the EC and their
member states. Downloadable from http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/services/nspw07.htm
45 Downloadable from http://gats-info.eu.int/gats-info. It should be noted that, although the
European Community entered the negotiations representing 15 countries (which counted as one),
the nature of the GATS is such that it partly resides in the Community’s responsibility and partly
in  each  member  state’s responsibility.  See  Court  of  Justice  1/94.  Hence,  differences  in  each
member’s reservations to financial services commitments are explained.
46 See,  for  instance,  limitations  concerning  the  issue  of  national  currency-denominated
securities, where in most countries it is required that they should be lead managed only by banks
established in the country or in the European Economic Area. commitments subject to stricter criteria than GATS itself requires. These
are set out in the “Understanding on Commitments in Financial services”
attached to the GATS. In sum, the Understanding obliges countries to bind
to  their  current  legislation  and  practice  and  covers  both  trade  and
investment in financial services;
c) no  MFN  (Most  Favored  Nation)  exemption  was  undertaken.  The  EU
waives  definitively  the  right  to  apply  reciprocity  provisions  in  EU
legislation. The inclusion of reciprocity provision in EU directives has
been  a subject  of  great  debate  inside  and  outside  the  Community,
especially at the delivery of the Proposal of the Second Banking Directive.
At  that  time,  in  fact,  the  reciprocity  provisions  that  the  Commission
initially included in the proposal were fiercely opposed by some member
countries and by third countries, in primis the U.S. and Japan. Eventually
the Commission toned down its demand for reciprocal treatment into one
of either national treatment or market access. At first sight, it seems that
no improvement has been reached under this aspect; however, it should be
noted that the EU legislation, as any legislation, is potentially subject to
changes. In this respect, the Understanding on Commitments in financial
services avoids that the EU might offer in the future a regime that is worse
than what it offers at present;
d) limitations  on  national  treatment  are  circumscribed.  In  particular,  the
European  Community  and  its  member  states  commit  themselves  to
ensuring that a foreign service supplier is guaranteed the same level of fair
treatment as domestic counterparts as far as “cross-border supply” and
“consumption abroad” modes of supply are concerned. Few restrictions
concern the third mode of supply (commercial presence) and are mainly
related to the securities and investment management business, i.e. those
businesses most recently liberalized in the EU area itself
47. The fourth
mode of supply (presence of natural persons) was left “unbound”, i.e. EU
countries did not make any commitment either to open-up their markets or
to keep them as open as they were at the time of accessing the WTO,
following a general behavior common to all WTO members;
e) limitations on market access, i.e. specific restrictions on foreign suppliers
willing to enter national market, outnumber those on national treatment.
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47 The Investment Services Directive (93/22/EEC) was issued in 1993; its implementation
could  have  been  as  late  as  the  1996  for  some  countries  given  the  possibility  of  a deferred
implementation date.There  is  just  one  EU-wide  limit,  i.e.  operating  throughout  the  EU,
requiring  the  establishment  of  a specialized  company  to  manage  unit
trusts,  under  the  UCITS  directive.  Remaining  restrictions  are  nation-
based,  mainly  setting  conditions  on  the  cross-border  supply  and  the
consumption abroad of securities and investment management business.
Although to different extents
48, almost all member states require certain
services to be provided by firms established either in the member state
itself  or  in  the  EU  as  a whole.  These  services  essentially  comprise
investment services and investment advice, lead management of issues
denominated  in  the  domestic  currency,  venture  capital,  pension  fund
management. Commercial presence is subject to the regulations in force in
each member state, which are generally non-discriminatory as the Second
Banking  Directive  states
49.  However,  the  directive  makes  a clear
distinction between the two different forms of establishment by a third
country foreign intermediary, subsidiary or branch. Only the former is
granted access to the whole EU on the same terms as domestic banks, i.e.
is granted the single passport; the latter may only operate in the member
state where it is situated. This distinction is carried over in the WTO
agreement
50.
Four main points deserve to be underlined. 
First, the EU schedules seem to embrace the belief that commitments should
also consider the potential interrelations between the rules governing each
mode of supply, especially for those modes where differences are becoming
progressively more blurred, as it happens for mode 1 (cross border supply)
and mode 2 (consumption abroad). The underestimation of this fact may,
indeed, generate divergences or doubts as to the true level of openness to
foreign competition; therefore care must be taken to ensure that commitments
undertaken and limitations imposed for one mode do not contrast or, better,
are consistent with those undertaken and imposed for another mode of supply.
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degree of openness to third countries.
49 Exceptions are present; see for instance Greece, which imposes minimum capital imports.
50 ”Member states may apply the restrictions indicated in this schedule only with regard to the
direct establishment from a third country of a commercial presence or the provision of cross-
border  services  from  a third  country;  consequently  a Member  state  may  not  apply  these
restrictions, including those concerning establishment, to third country subsidiaries established in
other Member states of the community, unless these restrictions can also be applied to companies
or nationals of other Member states in conformity with Community law”. European Community
and its member states schedules for financial services commitments; see http://gats-info.eu.intFor instance, if, in principle, the consumer is allowed to purchase any kind of
securities-related service from abroad (mode 2), but at the same time foreign
competitors are not allowed to provide investment services if not incorporated
in the host country (restrictions on mode 1), then, in practice, the consumer is
not allowed to exercise his right. On this specific point, the EU schedules do
not  separate  limitations  on  the  two  modes,  carrying  the  idea  that  the
restrictions affect both modes. 
Second, limited commitments were made in those subjects where no specific
prior EU-wide legislation was already achieved and in force. See for instance
mode 4 of supply (presence of natural persons) which was left unbound; on
the contrary where EU consensus had already been achieved, as in the case of
national treatment, more commitments and less restrictions were adopted by
member states. 
Third,  the  Single  Market  has  represented  a building  bloc  promoting
multilateral  liberalization.  In  fact,  those  EU  member  states  which  had
domestic pieces of legislation less favorable to foreign non-EC intermediaries
and initially bound their status quo, were later prone to lift such burdens and
relax some of the restriction introduced in the schedules (see last column of
table  4,  for  removed  restrictions).  In  most  cases,  these  country-specific
improvements were prompted by the need for compliance to the dictates of
the single program
51. In other cases, they might have stemmed from a need to
better address the issues of foreign competition when moving from regional
integration to multilateral agreements.
Fourth, it is evident that the EU bounds its existing regulatory regime for
financial services, as reflected in the EU legislation and practice. In other
words, the status quo has been secured. One exception regards the fact that no
MFN exemption was taken, which implies that EU cannot use in the future
those provisions entitling the European Union to deny entry to countries not
offering reciprocal treatment to European firms. This reciprocity rule is for
instance present in the first banking directive (art.9) as far as branches of non-
EC banks are concerned and is still governing the issue of authorization for
these kind of offshoot. The Agreement in force has therefore an immediate
and direct influence on the Community law.
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51 See for instance the elimination of the economic need test in banking by Austria, or the
opening of the Irish banking market to representative offices.In sum, the Single Market Program shows both a level of compatibility with
the WTO Financial Services Agreement (status quo binding) and a certain
degree of interaction between the different layers of negotiation, regional
commitments  (EU-wide)  versus  multilateral  commitments  (GATS),  (prior
restrictions lifted, no MFN exemption). 
What circumstances are at the basis of such a successful story? Mainly the
prevailing notion that the ultimate aim of the Single Market was to ensure
open  world  markets  through  multilateral  negotiations
52.  As  already
underlined, this liberal orientation was strongly inspired and led by the UK,
whose main purpose was to maintain and extend the City of London’s role
as an international financial center, in contrast with the French attempts to
create a European economic and financial area distinguishable from world
markets, a sort of a “Fortress Europe” discriminating against outsiders
53. The
importance  of  the  role  played  by  the  UK  in  leading  the  charge  for
liberalization  and  the  opening  of  markets  is  underlined  by  the  recent
involvement  of  the  private  sector  in  the  WTO  negotiations  as  principal
supporter of the EC negotiators. In fact, the work undertaken by the British
“LOTIS Committee” (Liberalization of trade in Services committee), which
represents,  since  the  1980’s,  the  established  voice  for  the  UK  financial
services interests in connection with negotiations in the WTO, inspired the
establishment of both a EU-wide private sector forum, the European Services
Leaders Group
54, and a trans-Atlantic forum, the Financial Leaders Group,
aimed at providing valuable, direct expert advice, information and support to
the negotiators (governments) at the WTO. This indirect involvement of the
private sector in the WTO negotiation is nowadays regarded as one of the
primary  factors  conducive  to  the  improvements  obtained  in  subsequent
liberalization talks.
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52 See EU Commission, Press Information, Europe World Partner, October 19,1988.
53 Remarkable is the statement by the Belgian EU Trade Commissioner, Willy De Clerq: “We
see no reason why the benefit of our internal liberalization should be extended unilaterally to third
countries” (Financial Times, July 14, 1988).
54 The  European  Services  Leaders  Group  brings  together  Chairmen,  CEO’s and  Senior
Partners from companies from all EU member states.V. The EU experience: a model for liberalization in the
financial sector?
As the financial sector is at the crossroad of many aspects of the economy, it
is vital for developing countries to achieve a certain level of development for
their financial system. In fact, it is a widely held view that there is no true and
sustainable  economic  growth  without  a financial  sector  efficiently  and
effectively playing its function of channeling savings from the household
sector into productive investments. 
The key pillars for a successful financial sector development are:
a) strong internal and external governance;
b) competition, both at the domestic and at the international level;
c) effective regulation and supervision.
Financial  liberalization  helps  these  three  pillars  to  work  properly,  as  it
enhances  efficient  sectoral,  inter-temporal  and  international  resource
allocation. A number of empirical studies have, in fact, demonstrated the
existence of a link between financial liberalization, financial sector efficiency
and growth for both developed and developing countries (Levine, 1996, 1997;
King and Levine, 1993, Harris and Pigot, 1997; Edey and Hviding, 1995). 
The  subsequent  question  of  how  the  liberalization  program  should  be
implemented – a big bang or a gradual reform – mostly depend on individual
countries circumstances. The EU is a successful story of reforms introduced
gradually over a number of years with much emphasis on public persuasion
regarding the benefits of liberalization and integration. The big bang, on the
contrary, seems to adapt well with countries with low savings and poorly
performing financial systems (Johnston, 1994).
What can we learn from the EU experience? The EU formula for reducing
barriers  in  financial  markets  comprises:  1)  coordination  of  financial
legislation  (necessary  for  the  acceptance  of  the  home  country  control
principle);  2)  adoption  of  a simultaneous  approach  for  domestic  and
international liberalization (at least for more advanced systems); 3) single
passport (mutual recognition as a pre-requisite for increasing competition).
39Two conditions helped the EU project to realize a successful story of financial
liberalization:  macroeconomic  stability  and  a constructive  role  by  the
government in the regulation and supervision of the financial system
55.
Indeed, liberalization cannot proceed at a fast and successful pace in time of
political and/or economic turmoil. As mentioned in section II of this paper, it
is only in the second half of the eighties, when the world and EC macro
conditions had improved, that the Community showed a renewed willingness
and confidence in its ability to pursue the important goal of creating the
Single Market. 
Moreover, the support of national governments in strengthening prudential
regulation and supervision was vital to sustain the whole architecture of the
SMP based  on  “minimum  harmonization,  mutual  recognition  and  home
country control”. Two features should not be underestimated. 
First,  that  each  EU  government  was  relatively  free  from  pressures  of
influential interest groups being the political élites usually separated from the
economic élites. Since regulation is a political bureaucratic process, where
producers and consumers’ interests are usually opposed, it is reasonable to
assume that the final outcome is influenced by a rent-seeking struggle among
different  interest  groups.  According  to  the  public  choice  theory
56,
economically oriented interest groups such as business groups have a higher
probability  of  striking  a bargain  with  the  member  of  the  key  legislative
committees and obtain a distributional favor such as a regulation that shelters
domestic  producers  from  foreign  competition.  However,  under  certain
circumstances,  in  a competitive  democracy  such  distributional  coalitions
cannot  oppose  for  ever  welfare-maximizing  reforms;  therefore  a set  of
reforms  beneficial  to  the  consumers  but  not  necessarily,  or  at  least  not
immediately, to the economic élites is eventually introduced
57. This can prove
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55 Kono et al. (1997).
56 Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Olson (1965) represent the founding fathers of this stream
of literature; Mueller (1989) provides an excellent review of the state of the art in public finance.
In a more recent approach, the making of economic policy is analyzed from a transaction-costs
perspective  (Dixit,  1996),  that  views  policymaking  as  a process  in  real  time  where  many
participants (principals) try to affect the action of the immediate policymaker (agent).
57 In this respect, it is important to understand that the EU legislation stems from a political
game between different governments, each of them representing specific economic systems and
cultures and being influenced by different interest groups, showing sometimes divergent interests.
In sum, the agreements that emerged reflect a reconciliation between the pursuit of national
interests and the need for a larger cooperation among member states. As Story and Walter (1997,
pp. 2) clearly depict, EU legislation on financial services was a negotiated product of the clash of
ambitions and inhibitions among the states and the interests which negotiated it. difficult in political systems where the political and economic interests are
extremely entrenched, as it happens in too many developing countries. 
Second, a system of “sticks and carrots” was in force, working efficiently
especially with those countries that had to liberalize the most (and apparently
could lose most from their opening up to foreign competition). The potential
benefits stemming from being an “in-country” were sufficiently strong to help
swallow the dismantling of protectionist barriers. For some countries, with
less developed banking systems and financial markets, it meant a greater level
of prior adjustment (costs) in expectation of reaping future (and as such not
sure) benefits.
Given the above mentioned pre-conditions, can this model be regarded as
a blueprint for opening up markets for MENA countries
58 or for developing
countries  in  general?  In  this  respect  the  second  condition  –  the
government’s role – might present the greatest uncertainties. The power of
entrenched  interests  tend  to  be  greater  in  developing  countries,  where
linkages between politicians, influential families and economic interests are
more stringent, as the Asian countries have recently demonstrated. If tough
measures need to be implemented in a short period of time
59 , governments
can only gain the social support if a system of sticks and carrots is at work.
What could be the carrot? An enhanced partnership with the EU, particularly
on the matter of movement of natural persons, could be the answer. In this
regard,  it  is  worth  recalling  that  the  Euro-Mediterranean  partnership  is
intended to promote a new phase of the relationship, including bilateral trade
and  development  cooperation,  among  the  15  Member  States  and  the
12 Mediterranean  Countries,  forming  the  so-called  MENA region.  This
partnership is expected to create, among the others, shared prosperity through
free trade and economic and financial assistance. However, up until now, the
talks  and  negotiations  on  free  trade  were  only  related  to  goods,  with  no
specific references to services, in particular financial services. Indeed, the
level  and  quality  of  financial  supervision  in  Mediterranean  countries  is
a delicate matter. In a recent speech, the EU Commissioner responsible for
External Relations has clearly stated that harmonizing measures relating to
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Gomel and Roccas (eds.), (2000) and Mazzaferro et al., (2002).
59 The EU countries had almost 20 years to phase out their process of financial liberalization.
Such a long time window is no longer available to countries that are nowadays confronting with
the task of opening up their markets, since the globalization process and the IT revolution have
increased the speed of any action and the need for conforming to a set of world-wide accepted
rules.the single market is crucial to any project for increasing the attractiveness of
the region to investors. The EU is looking for decompartmentalised and open
markets with sound and predictable legal and administrative laws. One useful
way to use the partnership could be to include technical assistance concerning
regulation.  After  having  strengthened  their  regulatory  systems,  these
countries could then start their process of liberalization with respect to the
EU, as an intermediate and useful step towards the negotiations within the
WTO-GATS. 
As far as the stick is concerned, this would be represented by the sanctions
that  the  non-compliance  with  the  negotiations  would  carry  along.
Commitments made at the supranational level tend to weaken the power of
entrenched  interests,  thus  facilitating  the  pursuit  of  welfare-enhancing
policies. This is exactly, though to different extents, what the Central and
Eastern  European  countries  (CEECs)  are  doing.  Their  experience  is
illuminating in this respect. The Council of Copenhagen has in fact stressed
that accession to the EU for CEEC’s and/or any future applicant will depend
on full acceptance of EU legislation, i.e. each applicant must go through
a process  of  transposing  and  implementing  the  entire  body  of  the  EU
legislation, through appropriate administrative and judicial structures. 
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The  investigation  of  the  sequencing  of  liberalization  in  the  EU  financial
services industry was the primary object of this study. 
The relevance of the EU model for financial liberalization is threefold. 
First, the route towards liberalization in financial services taken by the EU
might represent a blueprint for opening up markets worldwide, illustrating
which obstacles might arise in multilateral negotiations. 
Second, the EU model calls for an investigation of the degree of compatibility
between regional agreements and multilateral commitments, i.e. whether the
former constitute building blocs promoting multilateral liberalization or they
tend to act as stumbling blocs, impeding further achievements at multilateral
level. 
Third, the EU model raises the question of the extent to which the intra-EU
approach – minimum harmonization, mutual recognition and home country
control – can be transferred in different settings and used elsewhere without
the  supranational  legislative,  judicial  and  administrative  structure  of  the
European Community. 
As far as the first issue is concerned, the EU path towards the creation of an
integrated, common market highlights the need for minimum harmonization
as  a realizable  goal  instead  of  full  harmonization  of  rules.  Minimum
harmonization requires minimum agreement on essential rules, mainly in the
field  of  prudential  regulation  and  supervision.  It  represents  an  important
pre-condition for attaining any further achievement in liberalization, through
mutual recognition of home country rules and standards and the acceptance
of home country responsibility in the supervision of financial intermediaries.
The EU-formula for reducing barriers in trade and investments and granting
market access to foreign firms is made up of mutual recognition and host
country  control as  founding  general  principles  for  reducing  diversity  in
regulations, while producing a pattern of regulation that could be conducive
to effective openness in financial markets. There are advantages in adopting
the  mutual  recognition  of  national  standards:  banking  and  financial
integration could be enhanced by the adoption of the home country rule which
43in turn would facilitate the integration among different regulatory regimes.
Agreements on what constitutes a minimum standard in prudential regulation
are  easier  to  achieve  than  agreements  about  uniform  standards.  Once
regulatory  competition  has  drastically  reduced  differences  in  national
standards, the transition from the principle of mutual recognition to a uniform
standard becomes relatively easy to obtain (Fratianni, 1997). The issue is
quite important and reveals the degree of successfulness of the Single Market
project. In fact, as long as only the principle of “national treatment” is pursued
–  as  in  the  case  of  the  First  Banking  Directive  –  no  true  genuine
market-opening can be achieved. A regulation that is non-discriminatory and
equal in its effect on domestic and foreign players, yet where there are great
differences  from  that  of  any  neighbor  or  any  competitor,  de  facto is  not
user-friendly to newcomers and impedes the release of competition. Striking
differences in national regulatory regimes and standards may make national
offers of liberalization, within the GATS, very diverse, leading to sharply
differing  degrees  of  liberalization.  GATS Article VII  provides  for  mutual
recognition by countries of each others’ regulatory regimes, on the basis of
multilaterally  agreed  criteria.  The  very  diverse  standard  of  prudential
regulation  or  supervisory  systems  around  the  globe  might  explain  why
industrial countries offered a somewhat cautious liberalization in the GATS,
compared to their more liberal commitments in other fora, e.g. the EU or
NAFTA. This could reflect a reluctance to open up their markets to financial
institutions from countries with regulations and supervisory systems deemed
insufficient  to  pursue  a goal  of  safe  and  sound  financial  institutions  and
markets  (Sorsa,  1997).  It  could  also  explain  why,  in  the  recent  Euromed
agreements,  the  topic  of  financial  liberalization  was  not  included  in  the
agenda.  The  level  and  quality  of  financial  supervision  in  Mediterranean
countries is indeed a delicate matter. Future GATS rounds will need to deal
more  with  how  regulation  should  be  carried  out,  and  come  to  a general
agreement  on  which  relevant  ingredients  should  characterize  a truly
pro-competitive regulation.
With respect to the second issue of investigation, the EU regional agreement
shows  a high  degree  of  compatibility  with  GATS,  with  the  multilateral
agreement on services, being one of its inspiring forces. Since its inception,
the  Single  Market  was  not  meant  to  exclude  third  countries  from  the
economic benefits deriving from a larger, integrated financial area. The UK
position  was  decisive  for  the  relative  openness  of  the  Single  Market  for
financial services. The British negotiators aimed at maintaining the role of
London as international financial center. However by no means does this
imply that the area is free from any kind of barrier and encourages or favors
44 Conclusionsforeign market entry. Truly, the completion of the internal financial market,
denationalized and open, still lies ahead for EU firms.
Finally, is the EU model exportable in different settings? And to what extent?
Some have argued (OECD, 2000) that the EU experience is too specific and
represents  the  outcome  of  the  supranational  legislative,  judicial  and
administrative structure of the European Community. The argument is strong
and should not be undervalued. Indeed, participation in the EU project for
a Single Market – a project that was not confined to financial market, it
should be recalled – meant benefits and costs for each member country. For
some countries, with less developed banking systems and financial markets,
it meant a greater level of prior adjustment (costs) in expectation of reaping
future  (and  as  such  not  sure)  benefits.  The  regional  agreements  proved
successful thanks to the operating of the well known system of “stick and
carrots”: sanctions were imposed on those countries that were too slow to
comply  with  EU  legislation.  Under  this  point  of  view,  no  room  for
generalizing the EU experience seems to exist. However, it is reasonable to
argue that the main lesson to be learned from the EU regional experience, i.e.
that the primary target for a liberalizing sequence is that of adopting and
strengthening prudential regulation and harmonizing these rules with that of
neighbors,  has  a universal  validity.  Moreover,  the  continuing  work  on
globally  acceptable  guidelines  for  supervision  seems  to  support  this
conclusion.
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The realization of a truly integrated financial market in Europe is living a new
momentum since 1999. In fact, in June 1999 the Cologne European Council
endorsed the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) which details the work
that has to be accomplished in order to reap the full benefits of a single
financial market. 
In particular, action is envisaged under three headings or strategic objectives:
a single EU wholesale market; an open and secure retail market; and sound
supervisory structures. For each strategic objective, the FSAP identifies key
areas for action, details the specific measures to be taken and establishes
priorities for each measure identified
60.
A single wholesale market
Under this heading, action is needed under six chapters:
1. enabling corporations to raise finance on competitive terms on a EU-wide
basis. This imposes, in particular, the rapid overcoming of the obstacles to
an effective mutual recognition of corporate issuers’ prospectuses, so that
a prospectus or offer document approved in one member country will be
accepted in all; 
2. establishing  a common  legal  framework  for  integrated  securities  and
derivatives  markets.  In  this  respect,  a more  clear-cut  definition  of  the
boundaries between the sophisticated investor and the less professional
“household” investor is deemed essential. In fact, the effective cross-border
provision of investment services is limited by the extent to which host
country investor protection rules, including business conduct rules, vary
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60 Priority 1 actions are those which call for immediate attention since they are deemed crucial
for the realization of the full benefits of the euro and for ensuing the competitiveness of the
Union’s financial services sector and industry whilst consumer interests; Priority 2 is given to
those actions directed to amending existing legislation or adapting present structures to meet new
challenges and fostering the functioning of the single market for financial services; Priority 3 is
accorded to important areas where a clear and general consensus exists that new work should be
undertaken with a view to finalizing a coherent policy by the end of the transitional period. See
Commission of the European Union (1999), p. 21.greatly among member states. It is commonly accepted that these rules
should be less stringent when it comes to sophisticated investors – where
the choice of “conduct of business regime” could be left to the contracting
parties –; instead, small, unsophisticated investors should continue to be
protected by local rules, supposedly best tailored to meet their needs; 
3. providing  a single  set  of  financial  statements  for  listed  companies.
Enhancing  the  comparability  of  financial  reports  issued  by  listed
companies; providing clarity and transparency with respect to the legal
issues to be settled in the event of take-over bids; creating an EU legal
structure  to  facilitate  companies  to  place  pan-European  operations  on
a rationalized single umbrella, i.e. a European company statute, are all
needed measures in order to allow investors and intermediaries operate in
an uniform and transparent environment;
4. containing systemic risk in securities settlements. This requires common
and coherent finality frameworks and legal certainty as regards the validity
and enforceability of collateral provided to back cross-border securities
transactions;
5. creating  a secure  and  transparent  environment  for  cross-border
restructuring.  In  particular,  clarity  and  common  rules  are  deemed
necessary in the legal issues concerning cross-border take over bids and
mergers, company statutes, and corporate governance; 
6. establishing  a sound  and  well  integrated  prudential  framework  which
works  for  investors,  by  setting  stringent  prudential  safeguards  and
rigorous supervision of pension funds, by widening the range of assets in
which  UCITS  can  invest  and  providing  a European  passport  for
management companies.
Retail markets
Establishing open and secure retail markets calls for attention in the following
key areas:
1. equipping consumers with the necessary instruments and safeguards to
permit their full and active participation in the single financial market.
This translates into supporting best practices in respect of information
provision – needed to assess credential of cross-border service supplier
and the integrity and performance of the services provided –, establishing
48 Annex Iclear  rights  for  consumers  and  effective  dispute  settlement  (redress
procedures).  The  Commission  approach  is  that  of  pursuing  mutual
recognition  of  essential  requirements  rather  than  attempting  a full
harmonization of financial products;
2. identifying and reducing non-harmonized consumer protection rules as
serious  unjustified  obstacles  to  cross-border  provision  of  services.
A balanced  application  of  consumer  protection  rules  calls  for
a convergence  of  rules  on  business-to-consumer  marketing  and  sales
techniques.  This  will  limit  the  exposure  of  consumers  to  undesirable
marketing  techniques  and  enhance  distance  selling  via  remote
technologies.  The  aim  is  that  of  determining  conditions  under  which
equivalence of national rules could exist as to facilitate the cross-border
provision of financial products without jeopardizing consumer safeguards;
3. creating legal conditions in which new distribution channels and remote
technologies can be put to work on a pan-European scale. The major step
towards this direction is represented by a green paper on e-commerce
policy for financial services;
4. encouraging the emergence of cost-effective and secure payment systems
for  small-value,  retail  cross-border  payments. TARGET represents  an
efficient  and  secure  option  only  for  wholesale  cross-border  payments
given the costs associated with this trans-European mechanism of payment
transmission. On the contrary, retail cross-border payments are mainly
operated through correspondent banking mechanisms; as such they tend to
incur in charges which are much higher on average than those within
domestic payment systems. 
Sound supervisory structures
The  state-of-the-art  in  prudential  rules  and  supervision  highlights  urgent
improvements as to: 
1. up-dating and strengthening the EU prudential framework and supervisory
structures as  to  sustain  stability  and  confidence  in  response  to  quick
market  development,  intensification  of  competitive  pressures  and  to
globalization;
2. develop a regulatory and supervisory approach that will serve as the basis
for successful enlargement;
Annex I 493. reinforcing  EU  collaboration  among  supervisors,  in  such  instances  as
fraud  and  money  laundering,  winding-up  and  liquidation  of  financial
intermediaries.
Besides, two “more general” conditions are deemed to apply for the sake of
a smoothly functioning, efficient EU financial market: corporate governance
and tax-coordination. Efforts are to be taken in order to harmonize national
codes of corporate governance – arrangements for the exercise of voting
rights by shareholders in other member countries, to provide one example –
and co-ordinate the tax treatment of savings. 
The Lisbon European Council in March 2000 set the deadline of 2005 for the
FSAP implementation, while the Barcelona European Council in March 2002
set the deadline of 2002 for the adoption of a package of eight legislative
measures: proposals for a Regulation on International Accounting Standards
and  for  Directives  on  Collateral,  Distance  Marketing,  Market  Abuse,
Financial  Conglomerates,  Insurance  Intermediaries,  Pension  Funds  and
Prospectuses. Almost all of these measures have been adopted by the set
deadline or are in their final phases of adoption (early 2003).
Table AI.1 provides an overview of progress on the individual actions in the
FSAP, as detailed in the several Progress Reports published up to December
2002, available on the Commission’s website: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/actionplan
Adouble plus sign indicates that the targets set in the FSAPwere met; a single
plus sign indicates that progress has been achieved in meeting those targets;
a minus sign indicates no progress.
50 Annex IStrategicobjec tive 1: a single EU wholesale market
Raising capital on a EU-wide basis
Action priority Initial FSAP State of play/follow up
Timeframe
(present timeframe)
Directive on  1 Adoption 2002 Proposal for a Directive adopted: +
Prospectuses  (Adoption June 2003) COM(2001)280, 30.05.2001.
Amended Proposal adopted: 
COM(2002)460, 9.09.2002.
Political agreement (5 November 2002)
Directive on Regular  3 Adoption 2002 A second consultation concluded –
Reporting (adoption 2004) in July 2002.
Establishing a common legal framework for integrated securities and derivatives markets
Commission  1 Draft for issue  Issued on 14 November 2000: +




Market abuse  2 Adoption 2003 Common position: CONS9359/6/02  +
Directive Rev.6-19 July 2002
Upgrading the ISD *
61 (Proposal November  Proposal for a Directive adopted: +
2002; adoption end- COM(2002)625, 19.11.2002
2004)
Towards a single set of financial statements for listed companies
Amend the 4
th and 7
th 2 Adoption 2001 Directive 2001/65/EC adopted  ++
Company Law  on 31 May 2001
Directive to allow 
fair value  accounting 
Commission  1 Issue by end-1999 Issued on 13 June 2000: ++
Communication  COM(2000)359, 13.06.2000
updating the EU  Legislative follow-up: regulation on
accounting strategy International Accounting Standards 
adopted on 19 July 2002 (EC)1606/2002
Modernization of the  2 Adoption 2002 Proposal adopted: +






Commission  2 Issue by end-1999 Issued 15 November 2000: ++
Recommendation on  C(2002)3304, 15.11.2000
EU auditing practices
Annex I 51
61 The FSAP included the publication of a green paper on upgrading the ISD. This was issued
on 15 November 2000 [COM(2000)359, 15.11.2000] and, as a result of this study, a directive
upgrading the ISD was deemed necessary.
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Containing systemic risk in securities settlement
Implementation  1 Commission report  All member states have implemented +
of the Settlement  by end-2002 the necessary measures. 
Finality Directive (Commission report A study on the implementation is
beginning 2002) expected to be finalized in March 2003
Directive on cross- 1 Adoption 2003 Directive 2002/47/EC adopted ++
border use of  on 6 June 2002
collateral
Secure and transparent environment for cross-border restructuring
Political agreement  1 Adoption 2000 New Proposal presented: –
on the proposed  (adoption 2003) COM(2002)534, 2.10.2002 
directive on  after the EP rejected the comprise text
take-over bids on 4 July 2001.
Political agreement  1 Adoption 2000 Directive 2001/86/EC and Regulation ++
on the European  (EC)2157/2001 adopted on 8 October
Company Statute 2001
Review of EU  3 Launch review Final report published on 27 March ++
corporate governance  early 2000 2002, available on DG Market’s website:
practices http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market
Amend the 10
th 3 Adoption 2002 New proposal expected 1
st quarter 2003 –
Company Law  (adoption 2004)
Directive
14
th Company  3 Adoption 2002 Reassessment is expected from the –
Law Directive (no proposal before  follow-up to the final report of the High
2003) Level Group of Company Law Experts 
and from pertinent decisions of the EU 
Court of Justice
A single market which works for investors
Commission  1 Issue by May 1999 Issued on 11 May 1999. ++
Communication on  COM(1999)134, 11.5.1999
Funded Pension 
Schemes
Two Directives  1 Adoption 2000 Directives 2001/107/EC and  ++
on UCITS 2001/108/EC adopted on 21 January 2002
Directive on the  1 Adoption 2002 Proposal adopted on 11 October 2000: +
prudential supervision  (adoption 2003) COM(2000)507, 11.10.2000
of pension  fund
Communication on  * Consultation launched:
clearing and  COM(2002)257, 28.05.2002
Settlement Action and priorities in this area will be
defined by the 1
st Q 2003  +
Open and secure retail markets
Distance Marketing  1 Adoption 2002 Directive 2002/65/EC adopted on  ++
Directive 23 September 2002
Commission  2 Communication:  COM(2001)66 ,07.02.2001 ++




purchasersCommission  1 Issue by end 1999 C(2001)477, 01.01.2001 ++
Recommendation to 
support best practice 
in respect of 
information provision
Commission Report  3 Discussion to begin  Discussions with industry and ++
on differences  end-2000 consumers are concluded. Information
between national  gathered are used for further
arrangements relating  Commission initiatives in the field of 
consumer-business  retail financial services
transactions
Interpretative  2 Issue by summer ‘99 Issued on 2 February 2000:  ++
Communication on  C(1999)5046
the freedom to 
provide services 
and the general good 
in insurance
Insurance  2 Adoption 2002 Directive on Insurance Intermediaries  ++
Intermediaries  adopted on 30 September 2002
Directive
Commission  2 Issue by summer ‘99 Issued on 31 January 2000,  ++
Communication on  COM(2000)66, 31.01.2000
a single market 
for payments
Commission Action  2 Issue by end-1999 Issued on 9 February 2001:  ++
Plan to prevent fraud  COM(2001)11, 09.02.2001
in payment systems Follow up will run from 2001to 2003.
Green paper on  1 Issue by mid-2000 Issued on 7 February 2001: ++
e-commerce policy  COM(2001)66, 07.02.2001.
for financial services  FIN-Net established in 2001 as an EU 
network of out-of-court redress bodies in
the member states for financial services.
State of the art prudential rules and supervision
Directive on the  1 Adoption 2001 Directive 2001/17/EC adopted on  ++
winding-up and  19 March 2001 (insurance undertakings)
liquidation of  Directive 2001/24/EC adopted on 
insurance  4 April 2001 (banks)
undertakings 
and banks
Electronic Money  1 Adoption 2000 Directive 2000/46/EC adopted on ++
Directive 18 September 2000
Amendment  1 Adoption 2001 Directive 2001/97/EC adopted ++
to the Money  on 4 December 2001
laundering Directive 
Commission  2 Communication  Commission Recommendation 2000/48 ++
Recommendation  mid 1999 of 23 June 2000 [C(2000)1372]
on disclosure of 
financial instruments
Annex I 5354 Annex I
Amend the directives  2 Adoption 2002 Pending developments in Basel II –
concerning capital  (adoption 2005)
adequacy of banks 
and investments firms
Amend the solvency  3 Adoption 2003 Directive 2002/12/EC and 2002/13/EC ++
margin requirements  adopted on 5 March 2002
in the insurance  
directives
Amend the insurance  3  Adoption 2001 Directive 2000/64/EC adopted on ++
directive and the ISD  7 November 2000
to permit information 
exchange with third 
countries 
Financial  1 Adoption 2002 Directive adopted on 20 November 2002: ++
Conglomerate  CONS9754/3/02Rev.3
Directive
Creation  2 Adoption 2002 European Securities Committee (ESC): ++
of a Securities  C(2001)493,6.06.2001 and Committee
Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR): C(2001)1501, 6.06.2001
Reinsurance  * (ongoing 2003) Commission proposal to be presented  +
supervision towards the end of 2003
Insurance Solvency II * (ongoing 2005) Long- term project to define a new  +
solvency framework for EU insurance 
companies
Third Money  * (Proposal end 2003)
Laundering Directive
Wider conditions for an optimal single financial market
Directive on  1 Adoption 2000 In 2001 draft directive approved for  +
savings tax (Adoption Dec-2002) the purpose of negotiations with third 
countries to promote the introduction 
of equivalent measures. 
Implementation  Ongoing examination A report identifying the harmful tax  +
of the 1997 Code of  in the Code measures was submitted to the ECOFIN 
Conduct on business  of Conduct Group Council in November 1999.
taxation
Review of taxation  3 Discuss in Tax  Action taken care of in the context of ++
of financial services Policy group the initiative on taxation of cross-border
occupational pensions
Commission initiative 2 Adoption 2002 CO(2001)214, 19.04.2001 +
on taxation of cross-
border occupational 
pensions
* measures in response to wider market developments since the adoption of the FSAP, but not included
in the original plan
Our elaboration of information present in several Progress Reports published up to December 2002.Annex I 55
Figure AI.1 summarizes the situation of individual measures of the FSAP
Source: Financial  Services.  Meeting  the  Barcelona  Priorities  and  Looking  ahead.  Seventh  Report,
Brussels, 3 December 2002Directive Issue date implementation 
date (by)
First EC Banking  1977 1979 establishes authorization procedures
Directive  for deposit taking institutions
(77/780/EEC)
Consolidated  1983 1985 brings EC supervisory arrangements 
Supervision Directive  in line with the revised Basel Concordat
(86/635/EEC)
Bank Accounts  1986 1993 harmonizes accounting rules and 
Directive  reporting requirements
(86/635/EEC)
Capital Liberalization 1988 1992 requires the removal of exchange 
Directive  controls with the aim of enabling free
(88/361/EEC) movement of capital within EC.
Own Fund Directive 1989 1993 provides a common definition of banking
(89/299/EEC) capital in accordance to the 1988 Basel
Capital Adequacy Agreement
Solvency Ratio  1989 1993 sets common minimum risk-adjusted 
Directive  capital adequacy requirements in 
(89/647/EEC) accordance to the 1988 Basel Capital 
Adequacy Agreement
Second EC Banking  1989 1993 provides for a “single passport” and 
Directive  gives a broad definition of banking 
(89/646/EEC) activities
Monitoring and  1992 1994 institutions have to make an annual 
Control of Large  report to the supervisory authorities, 
Exposures  detailing all large exposures (defined as 
(92/121/EEC) more than 15% of the institutions’ own
funds) as well as their largest exposures,
even if these are less than the mentioned
ceiling.
Capital Adequacy  1993 1996 extend the risk-adjusted capital 
Directives (93/6/EECrequirements to investment firms and set 
and 93/31/EEC) capital requirements for market risks.
Deposit Guarantee  1994 1996 establishes common rules for the 
Directive  implementation and functioning of 




Table 1: The Single Market- Banking services: the sequence of liberalization 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Mark-up – lending rate minus money market rate -
BE FR GER IRL IT NL PT SP
1980 3,70 11,85 1,99 1,33 0,87 1,76
1981 4,51 15,30 2,53 0,70 0,91 1,19
1982 3,47 14,87 3,45 1,17 0,73 0,46
1983 3,36 12,53 3,14 1,84 0,68 2,14
1984 2,78 1,80 2,79 0,79 0,60 3,98
1985 2,20 2,79 2,74 2,10 0,45 1,91
1986 2,13 3,59 2,51 2,59 0,30 0,70
1987 2,38 2,20 2,99 3,15 0,24 0,21
1988 2,67 2,12 2,61 3,22 0,54 1,33
1989 2,53 0,90 1,69 2,47 1,57 1,01 1,46
1990 2,44 1,53 2,01 3,18 1,71 0,71 10,79 1,56
1991 0,87 1,41 2,06 3,26 1,69 0,64 9,04 1,36
1992 0,68 1,04 2,59 14,15 1,74 0,73 5,00 1,29
1993 n.a. 1,34 3,64 3,59 3,67 0,55 6,54 1,07
1994 0,91 1,82 4,30 4,48 2,71 0,40 6,81 1,07
1995 0,85 1,86 4,31 4,29 2,02 0,26 6,79 1,09
1996 0,96 3,91 4,63 4,26 3,24 0,81 6,14 0,96
1997 1,01 2,56 4,54 4,08 2,87 0,31 5,78 0,63
1998 0,95 1,40 4,23 6,74 2,89 0,54 5,20 0,82
1999 0,89 1,29 4,74 5,17 2,63 0,49 4,81 1,27
% change 93–97 49% 91% 25% 14% -22% -44% -12% -41%
% change 93–97 in the  -64% -66% -64% -65% -71% -58% -80% -78%
money market rate
% change 93–99 31% -4% 30% 44% -28% -11% -26% 19%
% change 93–99 in the  -58% -63% -57% -33% -33% -57% -56% -55%
money market rate
mark-down – money market rates minus deposit rate-
BE FR GER IRL IT NL PT SP
1980 3,53 -0,36 1,15 5,42 8,73 5,37
1981 3,97 0,04 1,56 6,47 9,61 4,46
1982 3,98 0,25 1,16 6,35 6,69 5,17
1983 1,51 0,06 0,84 5,09 4,31 7,53
1984 2,03 0,04 0,64 6,05 4,84 0,59
1985 1,58 -0,02 0,76 5,76 5,45 0,91
1986 1,31 0,04 0,89 5,84 4,97 2,20
1987 0,67 -0,29 0,50 4,96 4,36 7,04
1988 0,50 -0,42 0,71 4,63 3,68 2,13
1989 1,88 -0,33 1,10 5,63 6,19 4,72
1990 2,17 -0,47 0,83 4,99 5,24 7,49 3,99
Annex II 59
Table 3: Mark-ups and mark-downs in EU selected countries.(continuing) mark-down – money market rates minus deposit rate-
BE FR GER IRL IT NL PT SP
1991 3,13 -0,13 1,18 5,16 5,22 8,21 0,70 2,50
1992 3,13 0,00 1,39 -5,29 6,55 8,37 2,16 2,86
1993 1,10 0,16 1,23 6,82 3,74 6,33 1,59 2,86
1994 0,85 -0,16 0,83 5,57 3,49 4,47 1,42 0,96
1995 0,76 -0,23 0,65 5,76 4,97 3,57 0,36 0,85
1996 0,58 -0,21 0,46 5,08 3,56 1,64 0,71 1,37
1997 0,58 -0,22 0,43 5,58 3,15 2,45 0,76 1,40
1998 0,57 -0,17 0,43 2,77 2,49 2,56 0,49 1,23
1999 0,55 0,00 0,19 3,01 1,77 2,52 0,06 0,59
% change 93–97 -47% -237% -65% -18% -16% -61% -53% -51%
% change 93–97 in the  -64% -66% -64% -65% -71% -58% -80% -78%
money market rate
% change 93–99 -50% -97% -85% -56% -53% -60% -96% -79%
% change 93–99 in the  -58% -63% -57% -33% -33% -57% -56% -55%
money market rate
60 Annex II




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Sequencing of economic liberalization
Source: Mohieldin (1994), p.40.
Figure 2: σσ -convergence of real deposit rates for selected EU countries 66 Annex II
Figure 3: σσ -convergence of real lending rates for selected EU countries
Source: ECB; national retail bank interest rates.
Figure 4: The first four principal components of the deposit interest rate changes
(for selected EU countries, over a moving period of 70 months)Annex II 67
Figure 5: The first four principal components of the lending interest rate changes
(for selected EU countries, over a moving period of 70 months)
Source: ECB; national retail bank interest rates References
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